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Lonely Sentinel: 
A Military History of Fort Madison, 
1808–1813 
PATRICK J. JUNG 
FORT MADISON was the first American fort in Iowa and the 
site of the westernmost battles of the War of 1812. Significantly, 
it was the only army post in Iowa ever to be attacked by Indians. 
Scholars who have studied Fort Madison generally agree that its 
location was its greatest liability.1 However, those scholars have 
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1. The most significant works on Fort Madison are Charles Aldrich, ed., “Fort 
Madison,” Annals of Iowa 3 (1897), 97–110; Jacob Van der Zee, ed., “Old Fort 
Madison: Some Source Materials,” Iowa Journal of History and Politics 11 (1913), 
517–45; and Donald Jackson, “Old Fort Madison—1808–1813,” Palimpsest 39 
(1958), 1–65. Most recent is a three-part article in the Journal of the War of 1812 
12, available at http://journal.thewarof1812.info/: David Bennett, “A New 
Perspective on the Last Days of Fort Madison,” Part I, “The Fort at ‘Belle Vue,’” 
(Spring 2009), 17–23; Part II, “Defense under Siege” (Summer 2009), 7–15; Part III, 
“Abandonment and Result” (Fall 2009), 14–20. An online source with valuable 
information is Eugene Watkins, “U.S. Regulars at Fort Madison: Biographical 
Sketches,” www.fortmadison-ia.com/DocumentCenter/View/502. Archaeologi-
cal work done at the site since the 1960s provides insights into the layout and 
geography of Fort Madison. See Marshall McKusick, “Exploring Old Fort Mad-
ison,” The Iowan 15 (Fall 1966), 12–13, 50–51; John Hansman, “An Archaeologi-
cal Problem at Old Fort Madison,” Plains Anthropologist 32 (1987), 217–31; Mar-
shall McKusick, “Fort Madison, 1808–1813,” in Frontier Forts of Iowa: Indians, 
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overlooked other factors that rendered Fort Madison inadequate, 
particularly for defending the region north of St. Louis. Military 
officers suggested establishing additional posts farther north on 
the Mississippi River, but the parsimony of the federal govern-
ment meant that no other fortifications were built, and the vast 
area north of Fort Madison was left undefended. Moreover, be-
cause the War Department established Fort Madison only to 
provide local defense for an Indian trading establishment, it 
never had enough soldiers to defend the entire upper Missis-
sippi valley, or even for local defense because of its poor location. 
As a result, it was susceptible to attacks by the Sauk and Ho-
Chunk (Winnebago), two powerful Indian tribes who perceived 
Fort Madison’s presence as an alien and threatening military 
occupation of their country. Thus, Fort Madison—small, under-
manned, poorly located, and dangerously situated—was vul-
nerable upon the commencement of hostilities in 1812. 
 To fully grasp why Fort Madison was generally ineffective as 
a military fortification during the War of 1812, one must under-
stand the post’s history prior to the conflict. This requires an 
assessment of the decisions made by various federal officials and 
military officers about the post’s purpose and location. Equally 
important is an examination of the U.S. Army in the period before 
the War of 1812, particularly those institutional characteristics that 
undermined military readiness and morale at isolated frontier 
installations. Earlier studies of Fort Madison have generally ne-
glected these factors, and none have examined the cultural forces 
that led the Indian tribes in the post’s vicinity to repeatedly attack 
Fort Madison during its short existence. The story of Fort Madi-
son during the War of 1812 becomes much clearer once these 
elements are considered. 
 
WITH THE ACQUISITION of the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, 
the United States gained possession of both banks of the Missis-
sippi River. Spain had received Louisiana from France in 1762, 
and Napoleon Bonaparte reacquired it for France in 1800. When 
the United States took possession of New Orleans in 1803 and 
                                                                                                       
Traders, and Soldiers, ed. William Whittaker (Iowa City, 2009), 55–74; and John 
Doershuk et al., “Defining Battlefield Archaeological Context at Fort Madison, 
Iowa,” Midcontinental Journal of Archaeology 37 (2012), 219–42. 
Fort Madison      203 
St. Louis in 1804, the Louisiana Purchase had a mixed French 
and Spanish population as well as slaves of African ancestry, 
Métis of European and Native American descent, and many 
populous and powerful Indian tribes. The American occupation 
caused little concern among the French and Spanish residents, 
but the Sauk Indians who lived north of St. Louis expressed con-
siderable apprehension. 
 Unlike other colonial powers, such as France, Great Britain, 
and Spain, all of whom had allowed Indian communities to re-
tain their tribal domains and autonomy in exchange for alliance 
and trade, the United States aggressively sought to dispossess 
the Indians of their lands. Shortly after taking possession of St. 
Louis, the United States in 1804 negotiated a fraudulent treaty 
with the Sauk and their close confederates, the Meskwaki (Fox) 
that eventually forced them to cede 15 million acres of land east 
of the Mississippi. The Sauk war leader Black Hawk, who at the 
time was in his mid-30s, noted that the Spanish, who still occu-
pied St. Louis at the time of the transfer, “appeared to us like 
brothers—and always gave us good advice. . . . We had always 
heard bad accounts of the Americans from Indians who had 
lived near them!”2 
 Initially, the small garrison of 57 American soldiers at St. 
Louis posed little threat to the Sauk, but the great expanse of un-
defended territory north of the settlement unnerved federal offi-
cials who wanted a more robust military presence in the region. 
In 1805 President Thomas Jefferson appointed James Wilkinson 
as the territorial governor of Louisiana Territory, which consisted 
of the part of the Louisiana Purchase north of the present-day 
Louisiana-Arkansas border. Wilkinson believed that the upper 
Mississippi valley was exposed and vulnerable. Of even greater 
concern to Wilkinson were British traders from Canada who pur-
chased furs from the Indians. Jay’s Treaty of 1794 allowed British 
traders from Canada (many of whom were actually of French 
Canadian ancestry) to operate south of the border. Wilkinson  
                                                 
2. Francis Prucha, The Sword of the Republic: The United States Army on the Frontier, 
1783–1846 (London, 1969), 1–6, 63–72; Patrick Jung, “Toward the Black Hawk 
War: The Sauk and Fox Indians and the War of 1812,” Michigan Historical 
Review 38 (2012), 29–31; Black Hawk, Black Hawk: An Autobiography, ed. Donald 
Jackson (Urbana, IL, 1955), 56–60 (quote). 
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and other American officials feared that these men would turn 
the native communities against the United States. Wilkinson 
wrote, “If We admit the British trader to a free intercourse with 
them [the Indians] . . . he will oppose himself to our plans. . . . 
By a Single whisper he may destroy our present good under-
standing with the natives.”3 
 Wilkinson developed an expansive plan for additional forts 
farther north on the Mississippi. In 1805 he ordered Lieutenant 
Zebulon Montgomery Pike to ascend the Mississippi and select 
                                                 
3. Prucha, Sword of the Republic, 73–76; Francis Prucha, American Indian Policy in 
the Formative Years: The Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts, 1790–1834 (Lincoln, 
NE, 1962), 76–77; James Wilkinson to James Madison, 8/24/1805, in The Terri-
torial Papers of the United States, ed. Clarence Carter and John Bloom, 28 vols. 
(Washington, DC, 1934–1975), 13:189–91 (quote; hereafter cited as TPUS). 
 
Portrait of Black Hawk by Charles Bird 
King (1837), from The McKenney-Hall 
Portrait Gallery of American Indians, 
by James D. Horan (1972). 
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possible sites for military posts. Pike identified sites at the mouth 
of the Wisconsin River at Prairie du Chien, the mouth of the St. 
Croix River, and the Falls of St. Anthony on the Mississippi 
River about seven miles north of the mouth of the Minnesota 
River. He stopped at the location where Fort Madison later stood, 
but he did not recommend it as a location for a fort; instead, he 
proposed two other sites roughly 20 and 30 miles to the north of 
that location. When he met with a group of local Sauk, he only 
discussed establishing a trading house in the area, and he left 
before identifying a site for such an establishment. The War 
Department did not share Wilkinson’s belief that extensive and 
costly fortifications were necessary on the western frontiers. 
Thus, Wilkinson’s plans never came to fruition, and the sites 
Pike identified would not see any fortifications, at least not be-
fore the War of 1812.4 
 Wilkinson settled for establishing a fortification at St. Louis. 
He selected the site for Fort Belle Fontaine along the Missouri 
River about four miles upstream from its confluence with the 
Mississippi. He also selected a site close by for a government 
trading house. Federal policy makers believed that private traders 
were a dangerous element among the tribes. British traders might 
undermine the influence of the United States, but American trad-
ers, many of whom defrauded the Indians and, worse yet, in-
troduced alcohol into native communities, often were little better. 
Thus, in 1795, Congress approved plans for government trading 
houses, or factories, as they were known. By 1810 twelve facto-
ries operated in the Great Lakes, the Mississippi valley, and the 
South. The network of factories was never large enough to drive 
private traders from the field, however, so by 1822 the system 
was abandoned. During the time they existed, though, the fac-
                                                 
4. Prucha, Sword of the Republic, 76–79; Wilkinson to Henry Dearborn, 9/22/ 
1805, TPUS, 13:230; Wilkinson to Zebulon Montgomery Pike, 7/30/1805, 
TPUS, 13:185–86; Zebulon Montgomery Pike, The Expeditions of Zebulon Mont-
gomery Pike, With Letters and Related Documents, ed. Donald Jackson, 2 vols. 
(Norman, OK, 1966), 1:14–15, 14n20, 15n22, 22, 37–38, 232, 235–36, 237n1, 245–
46; Dearborn to Wilkinson, 6/28/1805, TPUS, 13:239. An article published in 
1897 asserts that the first site identified by Pike for a fort was the location of 
Fort Madison, but Pike’s description places his site farther north near present-
day Oquakwa, Illinois. See Aldrich, “Fort Madison,” 98; Pike, Expeditions, 
1:235, 237n1. 
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tories often stood alongside forts; in fact, protecting them was 
the principal mission of many army posts.5 
 Advocates believed that the factories were vital for maintain-
ing friendly relations with the Indians. Among these supporters 
was Meriwether Lewis, who, fresh from his journey on the Lewis 
and Clark Expedition, was appointed as governor of Louisiana 
Territory in 1807. Lewis believed that the factory at Fort Belle 
Fontaine was inconvenient for the tribes farther north, particu-
larly the Sauk and Meskwaki, so he petitioned the War De-
partment to establish a new factory in the heart of their country. 
Secretary of War Henry Dearborn acquiesced and in May 1808 
ordered that a trade factory and fort be built. Upon learning of 
Dearborn’s order, Lewis met with Sauk and Meskwaki leaders in 
St. Louis and secured three square miles of land about a mile 
above the mouth of the Des Moines River (present-day Keokuk, 
Iowa). Dearborn also ordered the construction of another factory 
and military post (Fort Osage) on the Missouri River roughly 250 
miles west of St. Louis. Colonel Thomas Hunt was to oversee the 
construction at the two sites. Dearborn confidently stated that 
both forts would be “a guard at each of these trading houses.”6 
He apparently did not believe that either post would serve any 
significant military function; if he had, he would have followed 
the advice of Wilkinson and Pike and had the fort on the Missis-
sippi built farther upriver at a more strategic location.7 
                                                 
5. Wilkinson to Dearborn, 7/27/1805, TPUS, 13:167; Francis Prucha, A Guide to 
the Military Posts of the United States, 1789–1895 (Madison, WI, 1964), 60; Francis 
Prucha, The Great Father: The United States Government and the American Indians, 
2 vols. (Lincoln, NE, 1984), 1:115–34; John Mason to Joseph Anderson, 4/12/ 
1810, in American State Papers: Indian Affairs, 2 vols. (Washington, DC, 1832–
1834), 1:768 (hereafter cited as ASP:IA). 
6. Treaty with Sauk and Foxes, 11/3/1804, in Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, 
ed. Charles Kappler, vol. 2 (Washington, DC, 1904), 76; Meriwether Lewis to 
Dearborn, 7/1/1808, TPUS, 14:202–3; Lewis to Thomas Hunt, 8/8/1809, Letter 
21, Daniel Bissell Papers, 1800–1820, St. Louis Mercantile Library, University of 
Missouri–St. Louis, St. Louis, Missouri (hereafter cited as Bissell MSS, SLML); 
Missouri Gazette (St. Louis), 6/28/1809; Dearborn to Hunt, 5/17/1808, Letters 
Sent by the Secretary of War Relating to Military Affairs, 1800–1889, Microfilm 
Publication M-6, reel 3, vol. 3., p. 347, Record Group 107, National Archives, 
Washington, DC (quote; hereafter cited as M-6, with references to reel, vol-
ume, and page numbers). 
7. Documents written by contemporaneous observers support this conclusion. 
For examples, see Alpha Kingsley to Dearborn, 4/19/1809, Fort Madison Res-
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 Hunt’s sudden death meant that the task of establishing 
Fort Madison fell upon a less experienced junior officer, First 
Lieutenant Alpha Kingsley. Along with John Johnson, the govern-
ment factor appointed to run the factory, and Nicolas Boilvin, 
the assistant Indian agent to the tribes of the upper Mississippi 
valley, Kingsley departed Fort Belle Fontaine on August 24, 
1808, with about 60 men of the First Infantry Regiment. On or 
about September 11, the little squadron of flatboats arrived at 
the mouth of the Des Moines River as per Dearborn’s orders, 
but Kingsley and Johnson believed it was a poor site since it 
was subject to flooding. The location selected earlier by Lewis 
was also inadequate as it had few trees for lumber, no clean 
water, and was a half-mile from the river. Kingsley and Johnson 
apparently had no knowledge of the sites upriver suggested by 
Pike three years earlier. They finally chose a location, which the 
War Department subsequently approved, about 25 miles north 
of the Des Moines River on the western bank of the Mississippi 
(the location of the present-day town of Fort Madison, Iowa). 
They arrived there on September 26, 1808. The site had plenty 
of timber, a good view of the river, and “an excellent spring of 
water” that Kingsley believed was vital for the soldiers’ health. 
Because of the spring and its “extensive view of the [Mississippi] 
River,” Kingsley named the site Belle Vue (Beautiful View).8 
 
KINGSLEY’S MEN erected a temporary camp surrounded by a 
low picket stockade only five or six feet high. The permanent fort, 
as designed by Kingsley, would have two blockhouses fronting 
the Mississippi River with a third in the rear, thus creating a 
                                                                                                       
ervation File, entry 464, folder 4, box 68, Record Group 94, National Archives, 
Washington, DC (hereafter cited as FMRF); Thomas Hamilton to Daniel Bis-
sell, 9/10/1812, in Official Letters of the Military and Naval Officers of the United 
States during the War with Great Britain, ed. John Brannan (Washington, DC, 
1823), 65 (hereafter cited as Official Letters). 
8. William Clark to Dearborn, 8/18/1808, TPUS, 14:208; Pike, Expeditions, 
1:15n22; James House to Dearborn, 8/26/1808, FMRF; Bennett, “Fort Madi-
son,” Part I, 21–22; Watkins, “U.S. Regulars at Fort Madison,” 1; John Johnson 
to Mason, 9/19/1808, FMRF; Mason to Johnson, 11/11/1808, Letters Sent by 
the Superintendent of Indian Affairs, Microfilm Publication M-16, reel 1, vol. A, 
p. 259, Record Group 75, National Archives, Washington, DC (hereafter cited 
as M-16, with references to reel, volume, and page numbers); Kingsley to 
Dearborn, 11/22/1808, FMRF (quote). 
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five-cornered fort that measured 160 feet wide by 210 feet long. 
The soldiers labored throughout the winter cutting lumber for 
the fort, which would have a much stronger stockade with oak 
pickets 14 feet tall and between 12 and 18 inches in diameter. 
During the first two weeks of April 1809, Kingsley’s men com-
pleted work on the permanent fortification, christened Fort 
 
Original plan of Fort Madison, from “Fort Madison,” An-
nals of Iowa 3 (1897), plate following page 96. 
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Madison in honor of the new president, James Madison. They 
moved in on April 14, 1809.9 
 The site had several handicaps. First, a ravine about 100 
yards from the western wall of the stockade could afford an en-
emy 60 yards of shelter. Second, a ridge of high ground about 250 
yards beyond the north end of the fort could allow an enemy to 
fire down inside the walls of the stockade. Third, the bank along 
the shore of the Mississippi, like the ravine, afforded cover to a 
potential enemy. During the construction, Kingsley addressed 
only the second shortcoming. He built a fourth blockhouse on the 
ridge to the north and created a long, stockaded passageway to 
the main fort. The officers and soldiers of Fort Madison deri-
sively referred to this appendage as the “Tail.”10 
 Kingsley originally wanted the factory within the stockade, 
but an event during the final phases of construction changed his 
mind. Kingsley and Johnson met with Sauk and Meskwaki 
leaders and received their permission to occupy the site. During 
the course of their earlier meetings with Pike and Lewis, the 
Sauk had raised no objections to a factory; however, they were 
never told that a fort with soldiers would be built alongside it. 
The Sauk perceived the presence of American soldiers in their 
country as unnecessary and provocative. News of the expedition 
under Kingsley spread among the members of the tribe through-
out the autumn of 1808, and the garrison’s presence caused 
them great concern. Black Hawk noted, “The news of their arrival 
was soon carried to all the villages. . . . [We] were told that they 
were a party of soldiers, who had brought great guns with them 
—and looked like a war party of whites!” Kingsley assured the  
Sauk that his purpose was to construct a factory, and that the 
soldiers were only there “to keep him [Johnson] company!” As  
                                                 
9. Kingsley to Dearborn, 11/22/1808, FMRF; [George Hunt], “A Personal Nar-
rative,” in Van der Zee, “Old Fort Madison,” 517–18; Kingsley to Dearborn, 
4/19/1809, FMRF; Jackson, “Old Fort Madison,” 15. 
10. Hamilton to Bissell, 7/18/1813, Letters Received by the Secretary of War 
Registered Series, 1801–1860, Microfilm Publication M-221, reel 53, document 
H232, Record Group 107, National Archives, Washington, DC (hereafter cited 
as M-221, with references to reel and document numbers); House to William 
Eustis, 5/9/1809, FMRF; Missouri Gazette, 9/11/1813; Doershuk, “Battlefield 
Archaeological Context,” 223–24, 228, 237; McKusick, “Fort Madison,” 57; 
Bissell to Eustis, 9/26/1812, TPUS, 14:595. 
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the soldiers completed their work, a few Sauk warriors would 
sneak up on the men, take their guns as they worked, give a yell 
to startle them, and then return the weapons as they laughed at 
the frightened soldiers.11 
                                                 
11. Jackson, “Old Fort Madison,” 13–14; Black Hawk, Autobiography, 59–60, 63–64 
(quote). 
 
Revised plan of Fort Madison (Nos. 1–4: blockhouses; 
No. 5: officers’ quarters; No. 6: enlisted men’s bar-
racks; No. 7: powder magazine; No. 8: stockaded walk-
way; No. 9: parade area; No. 10: factory; No. 11: ra-
vine). From Donald Jackson, “Old Fort Madison—
1808–1813,” Palimpsest 39 (1958), facing page 64. 
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 Kingsley took these pranks seriously. He requested another 
meeting with the Sauk leaders, although the council did not end 
as he had hoped. In early April 1809, as his men were busy fin-
ishing the fort’s construction, Kingsley held the council within 
the confines of the temporary camp. Many Sauk stood on barrels 
and blocks of wood to watch the proceedings over the short 
stockade. Worried about the presence of about 400 Indians, 
Kingsley had his soldiers load their individual weapons and had 
several men ready an artillery piece. A group of warriors outside 
the stockade began to dance, proceeded to the gate, and indicated 
their intention to dance for the soldiers within the enclosure. Up-
on their arrival at the gate, the council abruptly ended. Kingsley 
ordered his men to their arms and wheeled the artillery into place, 
with a soldier holding a lit match ready to fire a blast into the 
Indians if they forced their way through the entrance. The Sauk 
leaders ordered the dancers back, and the tense situation was 
defused. Nonetheless, the incident led Kingsley to decide, during 
the final phases of construction, to place the factory 30 yards out-
side the stockade so the Indians could conduct their transactions 
without having to enter the confines of Fort Madison.12 
 Black Hawk later asserted that there had been no pre-
meditated intent to assault the fort. Yet it appears that the Sauk 
had assembled at Fort Madison with the intention of destroying 
it. Black Hawk subsequently acknowledged that “had our party 
got into the fort, all the whites would have been killed.”13  
 It also appears that Kingsley had been alerted to the plot. 
George Hunt, the post sutler who ran the soldiers’ commissary 
—which provided sundry items such as tobacco, sugar, and 
shoe polish—had received word about an intended attack from 
a friendly Ioway Indian. Nicholas Jarrot, a local trader, had heard 
of a plan to infiltrate the fort and slaughter its inhabitants from 
other traders who worked among the Sauk. Both men passed 
their intelligence on to Kingsley.14 
                                                 
12. Jackson, “Old Fort Madison,” 16–19; Kingsley to Dearborn, 4/19/1809, 
FMRF. 
13. Black Hawk, Autobiography, 65. 
14. Kingsley to Dearborn, 4/19/1809, FMRF; [Hunt], “Personal Narrative,” 
520–24; Affidavit of Nicholas Jarrot, 5/23/1809, FMRF; Affidavit of John Johnson, 
11/18/1809, FMRF. 
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 Prior to receiving that information, Kingsley had sent one of 
his subordinates, Second Lieutenant Nathaniel Pryor, to St. Louis 
to acquire additional building materials. By the time Pryor ar-
rived in St. Louis, William Clark, Meriwether Lewis’s former co-
commander and the government’s chief Indian agent at St. Louis, 
had received similar intelligence from his “spies” among the 
Indians, and he learned from Pryor of the unfinished state of the 
fort. In response, Captain James House, Kingsley’s superior at 
Fort Belle Fontaine, took two artillery pieces and 30 men on flat-
boats to reinforce Fort Madison. Lewis also sent a detachment of 
militia northward by land. Neither House nor the militia arrived 
in time to be of assistance.15 
 
THE THREAT of Indian attacks was not limited to Fort Madison 
in the spring of 1809. Army officers, Indian agents, and territorial 
officials noted a significant amount of Indian unrest throughout 
the Old Northwest. They placed the blame for this discontent 
squarely upon the shoulders of British traders from Canada.16 
The reality was more complex, however. From the late 1730s on-
ward, native communities developed a newfound sense of racial 
solidarity that emerged from increased contacts among the tribes. 
From this invigorated sense of pan-tribal identity, powerful reli-
gious movements arose that mixed traditional beliefs with ele-
ments of Christianity learned from missionaries. Religious lead-
ers known as “prophets” preached a brand of militant nativism 
that advocated Indian unity in the face of white encroachment. 
According to this theology, an all-powerful deity, known as the 
Master of Life, had created Indians, while Euro-Americans were 
                                                 
15. House to Dearborn, 5/9/1809, FMRF; Clark to Dearborn, 4/5/1809, TPUS, 
14:260; House to Eustis, 4/10/1809, M-221, 23:H392; Missouri Gazette, 4/26/ 
1809. Several earlier scholars have asserted that Kingsley sent Pryor to St. Louis 
to request reinforcements, but Kingsley’s letter of April 19, 1809, cited in n. 14, 
does not support that conclusion. See Jackson, “Old Fort Madison,” 16–17; 
Aldrich, “Fort Madison,” 101; and Bennett, “Fort Madison,” Part I, 23. 
16. For examples, see William Wells to William Henry Harrison, 4/8/1809, in 
Messages and Letters of William Henry Harrison, ed. Logan Esarey, 2 vols. (Indi-
anapolis, 1922), 1:239–43 (hereafter cited as WHHL); Harrison to Eustis, 4/18/ 
1809, WHHL, 1:340–42; Boilvin to Clark, 4/21/1809, TPUS, 14:272–73; Clark to 
Dearborn, 4/30/1809, TPUS, 14:271; Mason, Circular Letter, 4/16/1811, M-16, 
2:B:289–90; Kingsley to Dearborn, 4/19/1809, FMRF. 
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a manifestation of malevolent forces that had to be effaced from 
North America in order for native communities to regain their 
lands and autonomy.17 
 Indian political leaders tapped into these sentiments and 
built military alliances that warred against the colonial powers. 
For example, Pontiac, with the assistance of Neolin, or the Del-
aware Prophet, crafted a pan-tribal movement in the 1760s and 
launched a series of assaults against British posts in the Great 
Lakes region. As white settlers poured into the trans-Appalachian 
West in the early nineteenth century, the nativist movement be-
came decidedly anti-American. During this period, Tenskwatawa, 
better known as the Shawnee Prophet, claimed to have received 
a vision from the Master of Life and encouraged his followers to 
resist white culture and its expansion. Soon, his teachings were 
carried to Indian communities throughout the region.18 
 Tenskwatawa’s brother Tecumseh used this message to forge 
a pan-tribal confederacy that sought to turn back the tide of 
white settlement. The Ho-Chunk were among the strongest sup-
porters of the Shawnee Prophet and Tecumseh; some Sauk also 
followed them. Yet the Shawnee brothers’ movement was just 
one component of a larger ideology of resisting American ex-
pansion that pervaded the Indian communities in the region. 
 The deceit exhibited by the federal government in its negoti-
ation of the 1804 treaty with the Sauk as well as the military oc-
cupation of their homeland with the establishment of Fort Madi-
son drove many Sauk warriors to embrace this ideology. Black 
Hawk in particular adopted much of the rhetoric of the greater 
nativist movement. In one speech he asserted that all Indians 
“form but one body, to preserve our lands, and to make war 
against the Big Knives [Americans]. . . . If the Master of Life favors 
us, you shall again find your lands as they formerly were.”19 
                                                 
17. Gregory Dowd, A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for 
Unity, 1745–1815 (Baltimore, 1992), 23–201; Alfred Cave, Prophets of the Great 
Spirit: Native American Revitalization Movements in Eastern North America (Lin-
coln, NE, 2006), 1–139. 
18. Dowd, A Spirited Resistance, 33–36; R. David Edmunds, The Shawnee Prophet 
(Lincoln, NE, 1983), 28–78.  
19. R. David Edmunds, Tecumseh and the Quest for Indian Leadership (Boston, 
1984), 32–44, 94–95; idem, “Tecumseh’s Native Allies: Warriors Who Fought 
for the Crown,” in War on the Great Lakes: Essays Commemorating the 175th An-
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 Thus, despite the pronouncements of American officials that 
the British in Canada were the cause of Indian unrest, tribes 
such as the Sauk and Ho-Chunk developed an ideology of re-
sistance against the United States independent of any British 
machinations. Instead, the various native communities and the 
British in Canada became allies because they pursued a com-
mon policy: protecting their lands from the rapacious American 
republic and its land-hungry population.20 The soldiers of Fort 
Madison had the misfortune of being situated in the midst of 
two tribes that zealously sought to prevent the American occu-
pation of their homelands. 
 
THE UNFINISHED STATE of Fort Madison had made it an 
inviting target for the Sauk in April 1809. The completion of the 
fort and its sturdy stockade delayed further Indian attacks until 
conditions became more favorable with the creation of a renewed 
British alliance and the initiation of hostilities in late 1811. Thus, 
in the three years that followed the attempted Sauk assault, the 
garrison experienced peace and the routine of a frontier post.  
 That routine and order were undermined, however, by a 
chronic shortage of soldiers. Never in the first four years of its 
existence did Fort Madison have more than 80 men. Discharges, 
desertions, and sickness continually drained the garrison of its 
manpower until periodic replacements and reinforcements ar-
rived. A report in March 1811 recorded a total of 74 officers and 
men at the fort. However, since some soldiers were absent from 
the post on furloughs or assorted duties, the number present 
was only 59, and 11 of those men were sick or in confinement for 
various infractions. A report from October 1811 tells a similar 
                                                                                                       
niversary of the Battle of Lake Erie, ed. William Welsh and David Skaggs (Kent, 
OH, 1991), 60–63; Timothy Willig, Restoring the Chain of Friendship: British Policy 
and the Indians of the Great Lakes, 1783–1815 (Lincoln, NE, 2008), 229–34; Jung, 
“Toward the Black Hawk War,” 33–37; Black Hawk, Speech, 4/18/1815, in 
Collections of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin, ed. Lyman Draper, 20 vols. 
(Madison, WI, 1882), 9:278 (quote). 
20. Willig, Chain of Friendship, 5, 205–63; Colin Calloway, Crown and Calumet: 
British-Indian Relations, 1783–1815 (Norman, OK, 1987), 193–222; Robert Allen, 
His Majesty’s Indian Allies: British Indian Policy in the Defence of Canada, 1774–
1815 (Toronto, ON, 1992), 110–22. 
Fort Madison      215 
story: of the 56 officers and men assigned to Fort Madison, only 
38 were present, and 9 were sick or in confinement. In fact, ill-
ness frequently had the most negative impact on manpower. 
Frontier areas swarmed with disease, and army posts, where men 
lived in close quarters in drafty, log barracks, were particularly 
susceptible. At one point in 1811, the post surgeon at Fort Madi-
son noted that two-thirds of the garrison was ill.21 
 Other factors also undermined military readiness, particularly 
low morale among the enlisted men, who, even by the standards 
of the day, were poorly paid. Privates earned only $5 per month, 
while non-commissioned officers—corporals and sergeants—
earned $7 and $8, respectively. Considering that unskilled civil-
ian laborers at that time earned between $10 and $20 per month, 
the army’s pay scale was relatively low. Of course, Congress 
also mandated seemingly generous daily rations that included 
1¼ pounds of beef or ¾ pounds of pork; 18 ounces of bread or 
flour; and a gill (about half a cup) of whiskey, brandy, or rum. 
However, the army depended on private contractors to supply 
these provisions, which, if they arrived at all, were often spoiled 
and inedible. Not surprisingly, desertion from frontier posts 
was common, and often epidemic. Fort Madison was not im-
mune from this phenomenon; in fact, three of Kingsley’s men 
attempted to desert as he made his way up the Mississippi to 
establish the post. Enlisted men also spent much of their time 
engaged in toilsome and dreary pursuits, particularly the build-
ing and maintenance of their forts. Since army units constituted 
a concentrated force of manpower, particularly in frontier areas, 
soldiers spent much of their time engaged in construction proj-
ects such as building roads. At Fort Madison, Johnson had the 
soldiers construct his factory and process the furs he collected, 
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tasks for which they received an additional ten cents per day 
and an extra ration of liquor.22 
 Fort Madison also had problems peculiar to it that stemmed 
from its leadership. In September 1809, Captain Horatio Stark 
replaced Kingsley as the fort’s senior officer. Stark’s superior was 
Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Bissell, who commanded Fort Belle 
Fontaine. Stark’s immediate subordinate was First Lieutenant 
Thomas Hamilton. Stark was frequently absent from the post, 
citing the difficult winters as a reason for spending many months 
away from his command while recuperating at Fort Belle Fon-
taine and enjoying the more cosmopolitan atmosphere of nearby 
St. Louis. Stark was a stern disciplinarian and liberally meted out 
punishment, particularly flogging. He regularly sentenced sol-
diers to as many as 50 lashes for minor offenses such as sitting 
down while on guard duty. Fort Madison, like all frontier posts, 
had a variety of civilian personnel, and Stark often had stormy 
relations with them as well. He dismissed George Hunt as the 
post sutler so he could appoint a local favorite, Denis Julien. In 
one case, Stark had a civilian employed by Julien sentenced to 50 
lashes for selling whiskey to a soldier without permission. Hunt 
did not record whether he harbored ill will against Stark as a re-
sult of his ouster, but the post surgeon, Robert Simpson, wrote a 
scathing letter to the War Department complaining about Stark’s 
capricious leadership. After Stark arrested him on “a frivolous 
charge,” Simpson requested a furlough so he could travel to 
Washington to lodge a formal complaint. Secretary of War Wil-
liam Eustis took the accusations seriously and forwarded a copy 
of Simpson’s charges to Bissell, noting that Fort Madison ap-
peared to be “the scene of many irregularities.”23 
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 Eustis almost certainly referred at least indirectly to another 
letter his office received. Who wrote that letter is unknown; the 
writer identified himself only as “A Democrat.” The contents 
leveled serious allegations against Stark, asserting that he was 
partial to British traders and that he once even uttered the scan-
dalous statement, “A limitted Monarchy would suit the American 
people best!!!” The anonymous letter writer’s most severe indict-
ment concerned the lack of preparedness at Fort Madison. As the 
unknown author caustically noted, “The Garrison looks as if it 
was ready to be given up at the first Summons. No fixed ammu-
nition—no appointed places for her officers and soldiers in case 
of an alarm.”24 Of course, one must take these accusations with a 
grain of salt, coming as they do from an anonymous source. Yet 
the author, whether a soldier or a civilian, echoed many of Simp-
son’s complaints. Bissell, for his part, noted in a letter to the 
War Department that while there may have been a “Relaxation 
of Duty and some want to Propriety in Capt. Starke’s [sic] con-
duct,” Fort Madison, as far as he knew, was “in Good Repair, 
and Judiciously Commanded.”25 
 Bissell did not believe that his subordinate exhibited sym-
pathies toward British traders. In fact, after Stark seized goods 
belonging to three British traders in October 1809, he wrote to 
Bissell, “Should those persons still have any sinister designs 
against the United States the means of future mischief is thus 
withheld from them until they can clear up their characters.” 
While Stark’s action may have demonstrated his loyalty to the 
United States and undermined the idea that he sympathized 
with the British and their traders, it was nevertheless charac-
teristic of his injudicious nature. Bissell, seeing no justifiable 
grounds for the seizure, ordered the goods returned.26 
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 If Stark did not endear himself to traders or civilians, his 
men thought even less of him, and his leadership negatively 
affected morale and manpower. When soldiers’ terms of service 
ended, few reenlisted at Fort Madison. In the summer of 1811, 
25 men were discharged, and Stark could convince only a few 
“drunken vagabonds” to reenlist. The next year was no better. 
He lamented to Bissell, “I have not men sufficient to post the 
proper number of Sentries, three being the extent of our force.—
The aggregate present is forty Six . . . from which are to be de-
ducted three Privates that can do no Duty. . . . Besides I have lost 
all Confidence in the men who have . . . been discharged; and 
who are liable to leave me every Day.”27 
 In addition to highlighting Stark’s flaws, the author of the 
anonymous letter cited above also mentioned the poor location 
of the post and the chronic shortage of soldiers. “The Garrison is 
in such a rascally situation and so badly calculated for defence, 
that at least 300 men could be hidden around it and could not 
be hurt by either Cannon or small arms. . . . There is 1290 feet of 
the Garrison to be defended, and at present but 50 men to do 
it—which makes 64½ feet for each man.”28 
 Stark agreed that the fort was poorly situated and expressed 
misgivings about its defensibility, but he could not be blamed 
for that failure; that had been Kingsley’s doing. Kingsley, though, 
was simply following the orders of Dearborn and Lewis, both of 
whom had decided to place the fort and factory near the Des 
Moines River. Even Kingsley admitted, in the wake of the at-
tempted assault by the Sauk, that building another fort farther 
north at Prairie du Chien—a location that, unlike Fort Madison, 
controlled key terrain and water routes—would be necessary to 
properly defend the upper Mississippi valley. Other military 
and territorial officials voiced similar sentiments.29 
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BY THE TIME the anonymous letter reached Washington, the 
trans-Appalachian West was already in a state of war. From the 
time the Shawnee Prophet began to preach in 1805, Indian at-
tacks slowly increased for the next six years. Clark recorded a 
total of 21 such actions against isolated American settlements in 
his jurisdiction from April 1805 to November 1811. Most inci-
dents amounted to little more than the theft of livestock and 
other property, but some were more serious. In 1805 Sauk and 
Meskwaki warriors killed three white settlers in Missouri; in 
1807 a Sauk warrior killed a trader at Portage des Sioux, just 
north of St. Louis. Fort Madison would have been the scene of 
another attack in April 1809 had Kingsley not acted promptly. 
Military commanders, including Stark, remained in a constant 
state of vigilance as they saw growing numbers of Indians follow-
ing the Shawnee Prophet and Tecumseh even as the British in 
Canada aggressively sought alliances with the tribes.30 
 The war with the Indians began on November 7, 1811, when 
Indiana Territorial Governor William Henry Harrison, fearing the 
growing power of the Shawnee Prophet, led an army of regulars 
and militia against the Prophet’s village near the Wabash and the 
Tippecanoe Rivers in present-day Indiana. Harrison claimed 
victory and dispersed the followers of the Shawnee brothers. 
Afterward, the frontier witnessed even more Indian attacks as 
enraged warriors sought revenge for what became known as the 
Battle of Tippecanoe. Thus, seven months before Congress de-
clared war against Great Britain on June 18, 1812, the United 
States found itself in an undeclared Indian war on the frontier.31  
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 White observers attributed these attacks to what they believed 
was the inherent barbarity of native peoples, but the Indians 
simply possessed a different culture of warfare. They avoided 
pitched battles that were costly in lives and fought only when 
they believed they could inflict damage against an enemy with a 
minimum number of casualties. The loss of a warrior meant one 
less man for future battles, and because Indian men were also 
hunters and providers, the death of a husband and father pre-
sented an Indian family with a significant burden. Thus, Indian 
warriors preferred raids and ambushes that depended on the 
element of surprise (as did the Sauk attempt to attack Fort Madi-
son by subterfuge in April 1809). Indian war parties also avoided 
fighting enemies that had superior numbers, and they saw no 
shame in withdrawing from a battle when the tide had turned 
against them. While Euro-American armies depended on disci-
pline to maneuver and control large bodies of soldiers, the Indian 
way of war stressed individual initiative in battle. Unlike Euro-
American warfare, which sought to neutralize an enemy’s ability 
to make war, Indian warfare served to avenge wrongs, and the 
mutilation of the bodies of dead enemies as a means of revenge 
was accepted. Thus, rather than being “massacres” and “depre-
dations” as defined by whites, Indian military operations served 
to punish those who had committed unjust acts and force ene-
mies to practice what was perceived as proper behavior.32  
 Indian war parties in the upper Mississippi valley skillfully 
demonstrated these cultural practices both before and after the 
Battle of Tippecanoe. Once war between Britain and the United 
States commenced seven months later, the Indian confederacy, 
more so than British soldiers and militia in Canada, carried out 
several of the first spectacular victories. A combined force of 
about 50 British regulars, 200 Canadian militia, and almost 400 
Indians conquered the post on Mackinac Island on July 17, 1812, 
before the American soldiers even knew that war had been 
declared. On August 15, about 400 Potawatomi ambushed and 
killed most of the soldiers, militia, and civilians from the garri-
son of Fort Dearborn as they attempted to make their way from 
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Chicago to Fort Wayne. The next day brought another American 
defeat, when General William Hull, with a force of 1,100 men, 
surrendered Detroit—without firing a shot—to a British force of 
1,800, including 400 Indians under Tecumseh’s command.33 
 On January 1, 1812, a war party of about 100 Ho-Chunk war-
riors, seeking revenge for Tippecanoe, killed two American lead 
miners at Dubuque’s Mines (present-day Dubuque, Iowa), about 
200 miles north of Fort Madison. George Hunt, the former sutler 
who was in charge of the mining party, only saved his life by 
telling the Ho-Chunk that he was English. Hunt traveled to Fort 
Madison to deliver the news, which had a devastating impact 
on morale there. Stark again had trouble convincing soldiers to re-
enlist. He wrote to Bissell, “My force is diminishing so fast that 
it will be necessary to have a reinforcement. The Soldiers who 
have been discharged . . . [have been] much opposed to remain-
ing, which was very much against my expectation.”34  
 
THE FIRST FATALITY at Fort Madison came on March 3, 1812, 
when Corporal James Leonard was killed by a Ho-Chunk war 
party while he was hunting about two miles from the post. Sev-
eral days later, friendly Indians found his body and returned it 
to the fort in a horrific state; his head was severed from the 
body, as were his arms, and his heart had been removed. The 
killing created a sense of panic among the soldiers and civilians 
at Fort Madison. “We are now so surrounded by [Indian] ene-
mies,” John Johnson wrote, that “we dare not venture to the 
limits of the public ground, or with safety, two hundred yards 
from the garrison. . . . I learn from all Indians visiting the Factory 
. . . we are to be attacked. . . . I believe every man of us will perish, 
as there are not sufficient men here to defend the garrison.”35  
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 Small Ho-Chunk war parties lingered in the vicinity of the 
post. On March 29 a Ho-Chunk warrior shot a soldier on sentry 
duty who died of his wounds two weeks later. On April 3, a 
guard killed a Ho-Chunk Indian near the gate. If the constant 
harassment of the Ho-Chunk was not enough, the summer of 
1812 brought further depressing news.36 
 In July 1812, during another of Stark’s absences, Bissell in-
formed Hamilton of the declaration of war. Soon after, Hamil-
ton learned of the disasters that had befallen Fort Mackinac, 
Fort Dearborn, and Detroit.37 The loss of Forts Mackinac and 
Dearborn in particular meant that Fort Madison truly stood as a 
lonely sentinel in the region. 
 In August 1812 Hamilton only had about 40 men. He asked 
Bissell for more, but Bissell was already stretched thin. He com-
manded Forts Belle Fontaine, Madison, Osage, and Massac (near 
present-day Metropolis, Illinois). In addition, Territorial Gov-
ernor Benjamin Howard had him establish yet another post, 
Fort Mason (near present-day Saverton, Missouri). Bissell com-
plied, although by spring he had only 29 privates at Fort Belle 
Fontaine.38 
 Nonetheless, Bissell well understood Fort Madison’s vulner-
ability, so he acceded to Hamilton’s request, ordering Stark to 
depart Fort Belle Fontaine on September 3 with 19 soldiers, 14 of 
whom were artillerists who brought an additional artillery piece. 
Along the way, Stark was to rendezvous with 17 U.S. Rangers 
who would accompany him. Those reinforcements would have 
increased Hamilton’s force to almost 80 men and officers.39 
However, they did not arrive on time. 
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 By early September 1812, the majority of the Ho-Chunk—
including the chiefs—were committed to the confederacy of the 
Shawnee Prophet and Tecumseh as well as to the British alliance. 
The Ho-Chunk had a more hierarchical tribal structure than 
most other tribes in the region, including the Sauk, whose lead-
ership took a more cautious approach and did not commit to 
war. However, Sauk chiefs, like those of other tribes in the Old 
Northwest (and unlike those among the Ho-Chunk), had little 
coercive power over their young men and could only employ 
persuasion to try to convince them to adhere to tribal policies. 
In the end, the decision to go to war rested with individual war-
riors. Thus, while the Sauk leadership openly professed neutral-
ity, that did not stop many young Sauk warriors from acting on 
their own volition and joining war parties that attacked American 
settlements and military targets. This became clear when a party 
of Ho-Chunk stopped by the main Sauk village of Saukenuk at 
the mouth of the Rock River and convinced many Sauk warriors, 
including Black Hawk, to attack Fort Madison.40  
 As the warriors set out, Hamilton had one small stroke of 
luck. On September 4, 1812, a private trader named Graham and 
16 of his hired men arrived in two boats. These men were the 
only reinforcement Hamilton received. Along with them were 
Emile Vasquez and her baby daughter. Emile was the wife of 
Second Lieutenant Antonio “Baronet” Vasquez, a man of Span-
ish ancestry who hailed from a prominent St. Louis family. His 
ability to speak Spanish, French, and English had made him 
indispensable to Pike on his expeditions, and upon his return, 
Vasquez had accepted an army commission. He arrived at Fort 
Madison in February 1812 along with 12 enlisted men as part of 
Bissell’s efforts to increase the garrison’s manpower.  
 Vasquez proved to be a valuable officer; the same could not 
be said of the other junior officer at the post, Second Lieutenant 
Robert Page. Stark had earlier brought up Page on three charges: 
drunkenness on duty (eight offenses), disobedience of orders 
(two offenses), and disorderly conduct (two offenses). Page 
loathed Stark and tendered his resignation from the army in 
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May 1812, but his original letter was lost on its way to Washing-
ton. Hamilton, in turn, despised Page, describing him as a 
“Cowardly pittiful Wretch.”41 Luckily for Hamilton, Bissell trans-
ferred Page to another post while he awaited his separation from 
the army, so he was not present when the Indians attacked Fort 
Madison.42  
 In response to the attack at Dubuque’s Mines, Stark had de-
veloped, and Hamilton later refined, detailed plans in the event 
of an attack. Hamilton was to command the two front block-
houses (blockhouses 1 and 2) and another eight men were 
assigned to the front stockade. Page, while he remained at Fort 
Madison, was to command blockhouse 3 and the western side 
of the stockade; Vasquez would command the soldiers on the 
eastern side. A sergeant had charge of blockhouse 4, which stood 
at the end of the notorious “tail.” Each artillery piece had a ded-
icated, well-drilled crew. By August 1812, Hamilton took the ad-
ditional step of having all settlers in the vicinity remain inside 
the safety of the stockade at night. Hamilton even motivated the 
soldiers with stirring oratory, urging them to “Sell that life (which 
we only value for the Glory of our Country) as dear as possible.”43 
 
THUS, when the Indian war party arrived on the night of Sep-
tember 4 and quietly took positions, the men and officers of Fort 
Madison were as ready as they could be given the fort’s limita-
tions. The various terrain features, particularly the bank along 
the Mississippi and the ravine, provided cover for the Indians. 
Black Hawk noted that he was so close to the fort he could hear 
the sentinels walking.44 
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 Shortly after daybreak, several soldiers left by the front gate. 
A Ho-Chunk warrior opened fire, killing Private John Cox, who 
was a mere 25 paces from the gate. A sentinel in one of the block-
houses returned fire, and soon shooting commenced on all sides. 
Hamilton and his men remained inside the fort for the remain-
der of the siege, much to the disappointment of the Indians, who 
had hoped that the soldiers would emerge from the stockade 
and engage in open combat. The Indians withdrew at nightfall 
but resumed the battle the next morning. On the second day, 
after shooting about 400 rounds, they struck the halyard of the 
flagpole and gave a great yell of victory upon seeing the Ameri-
can flag flutter to the ground. At nightfall, they withdrew again, 
taking Cox’s body, which had remained where it had fallen.45  
 The third day proved to be the most dramatic. At dawn, the 
soldiers of Fort Madison woke to the grisly scene of Cox’s head 
and heart impaled on sticks by the river bank. The Indians at-
tempted a new tactic, hurtling flaming arrows at the fort so as to 
burn it down. Hamilton responded with an ingenious solution: 
he had eight old gun barrels made into syringes, or “squirts” as 
he called them, and used them to extinguish the fires. Outside 
the stockade, the Indians plundered and burned Graham’s 
boats as well as nearby cabins. Warriors on the ridge to the 
north made it dangerous to move from one blockhouse to an-
other; the “tail” and blockhouse 4 had failed to fully neutralize 
the danger of that treacherous piece of terrain. That night, Ham-
ilton had the factory set ablaze to prevent the Indians burning it 
at a time when it could pose a risk to the fort.46 
 On the fourth day, September 8, the Indians fortified a nearby 
stable. Vasquez dispersed them with two well-aimed shots 
from an artillery piece. The Indians continued to fire on the fort 
until about 10:00 p.m., when their ammunition and powder ran 
low. By the morning of September 9, the Indians had withdrawn. 
In the end, Cox and a Ho-Chunk warrior were the only fatalities.47 
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IN THE WAKE of the siege, military officials began to question 
the wisdom of maintaining Fort Madison. Hamilton asserted 
that “this garrison is in the most ineligible place that ever could 
have been chosen by any man even if he would try.”48 Bissell 
had long believed that Fort Madison’s perimeter was too large 
for such a small number of soldiers to defend. After reading 
Hamilton’s report, he noted, “The extraordinary Tail, as it is 
Called, might be taken entirely from the Works, which was not 
thought by the Commanding Officer adviseable, as it is a covered 
way to the only Block House, which commands the ground back 
of the Fort. . . . I am fully of the opinion the Site chosen for that 
Post, is a very improper one.”49 Bissell, who believed that neither 
Fort Madison nor Fort Osage had any military value, suggested 
that new posts be established at more strategically significant 
locations such as Peoria on the Illinois River and Rock Island at 
the mouth of the Rock River.50  
 Secretary of War Eustis gave Bissell permission to evacuate 
both posts if the territorial governor approved. However, Terri-
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The burning of the factory at Fort Madison. Sketch by Wm. E. L. Brum, 
from Palimpsest 39 (January 1958), front cover. 
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torial Governor Howard was absent from St. Louis and did not 
return until March 31, 1813. Upon his return, Bissell immediately 
laid before him the reasons to abandon Fort Madison. Howard 
objected, arguing that it was vital to retain this lone outpost. He 
wanted to establish a fort at Prairie du Chien and believed that 
Fort Madison could serve as a staging area for such an endeavor. 
Despite his decision, Howard acknowledged Fort Madison’s 
flaws. “I never considered it a happy selection of Scite [sic],” he 
wrote. “Had my Opinion been taken before we were in Hostility 
with the Indians, it certainly would have been in favor of its evac-
uation.” Now, however, “I deem the abandonment of it unad-
viseable. . . . Our inability to maintain it . . . would embolden 
those who are now hostile.”51 
 Thus, Fort Madison remained, and as long as it remained, 
Bissell believed it needed more men. He dispatched a sergeant 
and 12 privates in early March 1813; later that month he ordered 
Stark to take 40 enlisted men and a lieutenant from the recently 
arrived Twenty-Fourth Infantry Regiment northward to Fort 
Madison. By early April 1813, Fort Madison had four officers 
and more than 100 enlisted men. The army underwent a reor-
ganization that year, and Howard became a brigadier general 
within the newly created Ninth Military District, constituting 
the territories of Illinois, Indiana, and Missouri (formerly Loui-
siana Territory); Clark became governor of Missouri Territory. 
That summer Fort Madison reached the zenith of its strength 
after Howard ordered 40 members of another unit, the U.S. Ri-
flemen, to join Stark’s company there, and Bissell dispatched an 
additional detachment of artillerists. By then, as many as 150 
soldiers from various regiments may have been stationed at 
Fort Madison. Stark received a promotion in April 1813 and 
soon after departed Fort Madison, leaving Hamilton once again 
in command. Exhibiting his usual bold leadership, Hamilton had 
the soldiers cut away the bank along the river so that it could be 
raked by fire from the forward blockhouses.52  
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 There were other seemingly positive developments as well. 
In August 1812 President Madison hosted a delegation of 33 
chiefs from the Sauk, Meskwaki, Dakota (Santee Sioux), Ho-
Chunk, Osage, Ioway, and Shawnee tribes in Washington and 
convinced them to remain neutral in the war between the United 
States and Great Britain. Nicolas Boilvin, who led the diplo-
matic offensive in the West in early 1813, had a young subagent, 
Maurice Blondeau—who was of French and Meskwaki ancestry 
and fluent in the Sauk and Meskwaki language—meet with the 
Sauk chiefs in several councils, three of which took place inside 
the walls of Fort Madison. Once again, the Sauk leaders pro-
fessed neutrality. The recruiting efforts of the British Indian agent 
Robert Dickson at Prairie du Chien did much to undermine 
Boilvin’s diplomacy, however. By the summer of 1813, Boilvin 
reported that, despite his efforts and despite the Sauk leaders’ 
professed neutrality, many Sauk warriors, particularly those at 
Saukenuk, remained hostile to the United States, as did a large 
number of Ho-Chunk.53  
 
BOILVIN’S FEARS were confirmed during the next attack on 
Fort Madison on July 8, 1813, when a 100-man Ho-Chunk and 
Sauk war party (which possibly also included Menominee war-
riors) attacked a wood-cutting detail outside Fort Madison’s 
stockade, killing two soldiers. The remaining men fled for the 
safety of the fort. A short exchange of gunfire followed before 
the warriors decamped. No prolonged siege occurred as in Sep-
tember 1812, but, as in the earlier action, the Indians used the 
ravine for cover. Hamilton decided further changes were re-
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quired. The ravine was too large to be cut away in the same 
manner as the riverbank, so he erected a blockhouse near its 
mouth along the banks of the Mississippi. He even built a “sub-
terraneous passage”—probably a trench rather than a tunnel—
from the fort to the new blockhouse so his soldiers had cover as 
they traversed the open ground between the two.54  
 Hamilton gave the men strict orders to keep the door closed 
and barred until the new guard arrived. However, on the morn-
ing of July 16, 1813, a corporal failed to follow that order. When 
Indians hiding in the thick brush of the ravine opened fire at 
about 7:00 a.m., the corporal tried to close and bar the door, but 
an Indian warrior attempted to force it open; that Indian was 
immediately gunned down. Then, suddenly, another warrior 
rushed to the blockhouse and thrust a long spear into a loop-
hole, impaling and killing the four men inside. The entire action, 
according to Hamilton, occurred in a mere ten minutes.55 
 The Indians attempted to gain entry into the blockhouse by 
removing the stones of the foundation. By that time, the garrison 
was alerted to their presence. Hamilton’s artillery crews fired 
shots and severed the arm of one warrior above the elbow and 
broke another’s above the wrist. The Indians and the soldiers 
spent most the day exchanging fire until the war party departed 
at about 5:00 p.m. Six soldiers died at Fort Madison in July 1813, 
more than during the siege ten months earlier. Many years later, 
the warrior who killed the four soldiers in the blockhouse, the 
Sauk chief Weesheet, posed for a sketch by George Catlin, the 
great chronicler of American Indians; at the time, he still pos-
sessed the spear and related with pride how he had killed four 
men with it.56 
 
DESPITE THESE ATTACKS, the soldiers of Fort Madison con-
tinued to defend the post. In May 1813 Bissell ordered Fort 
Osage evacuated. The demands of the war created a constant 
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need for men and officers, and a post so far west served little 
purpose. Reports of Indian hostilities in the vicinity of Prairie 
du Chien and Saukenuk and Dickson’s success in recruiting na-
tive allies the previous year made Bissell and Howard reluctant 
to abandon Fort Madison. Moreover, it was one of only three 
forts, along with Forts Wayne and Harrison in Indiana Territory, 
that had been successfully defended during the first year of the 
war.57 
 While the threat remained in the upper Mississippi valley, 
it would not be hostile Indians or the British that ultimately 
caused Fort Madison’s demise. After the attacks in July 1813, it 
was never attacked again. The problem was more mundane, 
but equally as serious: the lack of adequate provisions. The sys-
tem of private contractors upon which the army relied had been 
inefficient before 1812, and the war’s burdens exposed its weak-
nesses, particularly in frontier areas where transportation was 
difficult and expensive. The contractor who supplied the posts 
under Bissell’s command was particularly lax in his duties. Bis-
sell castigated him, noting, “I never have seen so much neglect 
in 25 years Service. . . . [Fort] Madison is now on allowance [i.e., 
rationing its food], and [Fort] Mason has long since been out of 
Flour, [Fort] Osage had a scanty supply the first of January, 
your boat having never reached that.”58 
 After the evacuation of Fort Osage, some of its men and 
officers were transferred to Fort Madison. While that increased 
the number of soldiers, it also increased the number of mouths 
to feed. In October 1813 Hamilton discovered that the supplies 
of flour and pork at Fort Madison were spoiled and unfit for 
consumption. Soon, winter would come, making resupply from 
St. Louis impossible. The specter of starvation presented a far 
greater danger than the Indians ever had.59 
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 Thus, on October 25, 1813, Hamilton ordered the evacuation 
of the post. He had six vessels to transport the soldiers and 
equipment to Fort Belle Fontaine. On November 3, he ordered 
his men to assemble the fort’s property on the parade (the open 
area within the stockade) so it could be loaded on the boats. 
That order was the last entry made in the garrison orderly book. 
When exactly the small fleet departed Fort Madison is unknown, 
but Hamilton recorded an entry as officer of the day at Fort Belle 
Fontaine on November 21. Presumably, the garrison departed 
within a few days of the November 3 order. All the buildings of 
Fort Madison—the stockade, barracks, officers’ quarters, block-
houses, and other structures—were burned. For many years 
afterward—indeed, until the 1830s, when white settlers began to 
enter the region—several of the stone chimneys and fireplaces 
stood like charred ghosts marking the place where Fort Madison 
once stood.60 
 
THE STRUGGLE for the upper Mississippi valley continued 
after Fort Madison’s abandonment. In fact, during the later stages 
of the war, American victories in other theaters allowed military 
planners to devote more attention and resources to the region 
than they had while Fort Madison existed. By the end of 1813, 
Oliver Hazard Perry’s victory on Lake Erie and William Henry 
Harrison’s success at the Battle of the Thames had secured the 
lower Great Lakes and the transportation routes into the upper 
Great Lakes. That same year, Benjamin Howard ordered the 
construction of Fort Clark at Peoria, which closed the Illinois 
River to Indian war parties and provided security for American 
settlements in southern Illinois and Missouri.61 
 The situation at St. Louis improved modestly in the spring 
of 1814, when Major Zachary Taylor (the future president) ar-
rived with two additional companies of regulars from the Sev-
enth Infantry Regiment. William Clark decided that the time 
had arrived for the United States to reassert its military power 
in the upper Mississippi valley, so he led an expedition that 
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established Fort Shelby at Prairie du Chien in early June 1814. 
However, the British commander at Mackinac Island organized 
a campaign that forced the surrender of that garrison in late July. 
The United States launched two more attempts to fortify the 
region north of St. Louis, but Sauk, Meskwaki, Kickapoo, and 
Dakota warriors thwarted both efforts. In the end, the British 
and their native allies controlled a wide arc of territory that 
stretched from Mackinac Island in the north to the mouth of the 
Rock River in the south.62 
 The British did not retain this vast domain as a potential 
homeland for their Indian allies, however. Instead, they decided 
to return it to the United States in exchange for a much desired 
end to the hostilities. Peace between the United States and Brit-
ain finally came on December 24, 1814, with the signing of the 
Treaty of Ghent, which went into effect on February 17, 1815, 
after both governments ratified the agreement. Great Britain 
merely demanded that the United States return to the status quo 
antebellum by making peace with the native communities in the 
Old Northwest. The federal government and the tribes negoti-
ated a series of treaties between 1815 and 1818. Despite those 
agreements, the Ho-Chunk and Sauk continued to harbor deep 
distrust toward the Americans and their government. The un-
easy relationships between the United States and the two tribes, 
strained by the continued misdeeds of federal officials in the 
postwar years, eventually resulted in the 1827 Winnebago Up-
rising and the 1832 Black Hawk War.63  
 The officers and men who had fought at Fort Madison had 
nothing to be ashamed of; neither did their Indian adversaries. 
The soldiers were forced to defend an indefensible site. That 
they successfully held out against three Indian assaults, and lost 
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nine men in the process, was a testimony to their ability. In retro-
spect, the Sauk and Ho-Chunk warriors who fought against them 
cannot be held culpable for defending their homelands against 
what they saw as a foreign invasion by an aggressive colonial 
power. 
 In 1913 the Daughters of the American Revolution com-
memorated the centennial of the burning of Fort Madison by 
erecting a stone chimney as a memorial to the soldiers who 
served there. At the time, the exact location of the fort was un-
clear. Later, the monument was moved to avoid highway con-
struction. When archaeological work began on the site in the 
1960s, archaeologists confirmed that the new location of the 
monument happened to be where blockhouse 1 had once stood.64 
Today, this monument can memorialize all the participants—
soldier and civilian, native and white, American and Canadian 
—whose lives were touched by the War of 1812 in the upper 
Mississippi valley. 
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